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The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-61, seemed 
to many Americans to be an "era of good feeling." The harsh 
divisions over the Korean War and McCarthyism had been healed, 
and the country enjoyed peace and prosperity; "I like Ike" 
was more than just a political slogan--it was a national 
sentiment. 
Yet, to the liberals in America, Eisenhower seemed to be 
merely a latter-day McKinley. To the liberals, this peace and 
prosperity was a euphemism for the stagnation and drift caused 
by the inaction of the Eisenhower Administration. 
With a growing urban and racial crisis, the President's 
sole domestic concern was achieving a balanced budget. For 
all the grandiose Cold War rhetoric of John Foster Dulles, the 
Atlantic alliance had been weakened, and Communism appeared 
to be making dangerous inroads in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. In the areas of education, scientific achievement, 
and economic growth, America was lagging behind the Soviet 
Union. In an age which cried out for bold, creative action, 
the U. S. Government responded like a tired, flabby businessman. 
As the decade came to a close, there was a certain uneasi-
ness about U. S. goals, or what was generally called "national 
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purpose." Questions were raised as to whether America's 
abundant material wealth had produced a softness in the 
national character. 
Diplomat George F. Kennan delivered a speech in 1959 
which was indicative of liberal thinking. Discussing the 
present condition of the U. S. A., he made a somber statement: 
If you ask me. .whether a country in 
the state this country is in today. 
has, over the long run, good chances of 
competing with a purposeful, serious, and 
disciplined society such as that of the 
Soviet Union, I must say that the answer 
is "no." l 
So, to most American liberals, with their terrible sense 
of urgency, the only person to lead the u. S. out of this 
quagmire of inaction and complacency was the man described by 
Senator Eugene McCarthy as the "prophet" of the 1950's'! 
Adlai E. Stevenson. 
II 
In December, 1956, Adlai Stevenson stated publicly: 
"I will not again run for the Presidency. 112 At the time, that 
statement seemed academic, as Stevenson had just suffered a 
second crushing defeat. 
During the years following 1956, Stevenson's political 
activities were largely confined to speaking at Democratic 
Party functions to pay off the Party debt and to serving on 
the Democratic Advisory Council, which set forth policy al-
ternatives to the Republican Administration. On the whole, 
though, he devoted his time to his lucrative law practice. 
However, his old supporters were beginning to stir. As 
leader of the Party in the Fifties, Stevenson had inspired an 
almost religious devotion from liberal Democrats. These 
people were not professional politicians; they were, generally 
speaking, people who had been drawn into politics in 1952, had 
labored tirelessly for Stevenson in two campaigns and were pre-
pared to do so again. It was here that Stevenson had a strong 
base of support for a possible candidacy. 
In 1959, "Draft Stevenson" clubs were formed in six 
states and in the District of Columbia. 3 During this period, 
formal sort of organization was set up by Stevenson 
L --
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supporters across the nation: from Wisconsin, whose Demo-
cratic organization had always been strongly for Stevenson, 
James Doyle gave supervisory advice to the ''Draft Stevenson" 
clubs in the country; in New York, the reform Democrats, 
closely tied to Eleanor Roosevelt and Herbert Lehman, hired 
William Attwood (foreign editor of Look magazine) to research 
and prepare speech material for a possible Stevenson candi-
dacy; in the Los Angeles area, film producer Dore Schary raised 
funds to promote Stevenson; and in Washington, D. C., lawyer 
George Ball and Senator A. S. Mike Monroney of Oklahoma formu-
lated the basic strategy to win the Democratic nomination for 
4 Stevenson. 
The backers of the "Draft Stevenson" movement knew that 
there was no scarcity of competition for the Democratic nomi-
nation. The Stevenson supporters felt, however, that each of 
the declared--or potential--candidates had certain liabilities 
which would be hard to overcome: 
1) Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, a 
dedicated liberal, was regarded as a wild-
eyed radical by conservative Democrats and 
was anathema to the South; 
2) Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts 
had unlimited financial resources and was 
a proven vote-getter in the industrial 
Northeast, but it was felt that his youth 
(42), religion (Catholic), and lack of 
experience would hinder him in the South 
and West; 
3) Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri was 
an expert on national defense but largely 
incoherent on any other issue, and he had 
no grass-roots following; 
4) Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, the 
powerful Majority Leader of the Senate, 
was believed to be a regional candidate, 
having very little support outside the 
Southern and border states. 
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None of these men possessed the national appeal, stature, 
or prestige of Stevenson, nor did any have his experience in 
domestic and foreign affairs. The Stevenson strategists de-
cided to present their man as the mature, experienced states-
man as opposed to these pygmy politicians interested in mere 
votes. Ball and Monroney wanted Stevenson to be the liberal 
voice of the Democratic Party, defining positions on the various 
issues, while the others engaged in bitter intra-party 
f . h . 5 ig ting. 
Stevenson was more inclined to discuss policies than 
politics anyway. Early in 1960, he took a stand on two con-
troversial issues, stating that he favored compulsory arbitra-
tion in labor disputes, 6 and that he favored admission of Red 
China to the United Nations ("It is clear that no general 
control of disarmament has any value unless it includes China, 
and it is difficult to see how China can accept international 
control when it is not, formally, a member of international 
society") . 7 In February, Stevenson embarked on a two-month 
"self-education" tour of Latin America. 
He was aware that 1960 represented his last opportunity 
to be President, yet he remained curiously aloof, not actively 
working for the nomination, allowing Ball and Monroney to 
struggle as best they could. Why was this? First of all, 
Stevenson took seriously his 1956 statement that he would not 
seek the Presidency again; he had restated this many times 
to party leaders since then. Thus, he felt pledged to a 
position of neutrality. 
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Secondly, he was unwilling to go through the ordeal of 
waging an intra-party struggle for the nomination. In 1952, 
Stevenson, then the Governor of Illinois, had been drafted 
by the convention--perhaps the only genuine draft in this 
century; in 1956, alarmed at the policies of the Eisenhower 
Administration and convinced that he alone possessed suf-
ficient weight to challenge the President, Stevenson sought 
and won the nomination again, but only after a bruising battle 
in the primaries and with various party leaders. He was de-
termined not to campaign for the nomination again; however, 
as a close friend said: "Deep down he wants it. But he 
wants the convention to come to him." 8 
Senator Monroney described the dilemma in which Stevenson 
found himself. Stevenson thought that he must honor his 
neutrality pledge, but, because he hoped for a draft by the 
convention, he would not disavow the efforts of those who 
were working for his nomination. "The first commitment pre-
vented an active candidacy. The second commitment prevented 
a graceful withdrawal. Our cause was to founder solely on 
this dilemma." 9 So Stevenson did nothing. 
In planning their tactics, Stevenson's supporters right-
ly judged Kennedy to be the greatest threat to their man's 
chances. Their strategy therefore centered around a "stop 
Kennedy" movement. Kennedy, to overcome his handicaps of 
H40 Io Go 
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youth and religion, -m\1-&E "9B to the convention in Los Angeles 
with the image of an irresistible winner, having a string of 
primary victories behind him. Humphrey and Kennedy were to 
be opponents in several spring primaries. Even if Humphrey 
won all of his primaries, which was highly unlikely, he still 
could not win the nomination; on the other hand, if Kennedy 
could be upset in just one primary, it might destroy his 
"winner" image. Based on this reasoning, Stevenson's sup-
porters gave financial aid to Humphrey, hoping that he could 
frustrate Kennedy and thereby benefit Stevenson. 10 
Unfortunately for them, their plans went awry. Kennedy 
beat Humphrey rather decisively in Wisconsin--Humphrey's own 
backyard--and then gave Humphrey a terrible beating in West 
Virginia; as a result of his humiliating trouncing there, 
Humphrey withdrew from the Presidential race. Within ten 
days after Humphrey's withdrawal, Kennedy coasted to victories 
11 in Nebraska, Maryland, and Oregon. 
Stevenson, in the meantime, had returned from South 
America in April and had castigated the Eisenhower Administra-
tion for its neglect of the area. A few days after his return, 
he spoke at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville on 
the eve of Jefferson's birthday. There he compared the 
Jeffersonian ideals with the America of 1960 and gave a scathing 
indictment of the Republican Administration: "Our foreign 
policy has been dominated by sterile anti-Communism and wish-
ful thinking, our domestic policy by fear of inflation and 
8 12 
mistrust of government." Stevenson went on to ask 
why we have lost our once unquestioned military 
superiority; 
why we have repeatedly allo~ed the Soviets to 
seize the diplomatic inlative; 
why we have faltered in the fight for disarmament; 
why we are not providing our children with the 
education to which they are entitled; 
why--nearly a century after the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments--all of our citizens 
have still not been guaranteed the right 
to vote; 
why we spend billions of dollars storing surplus 
food when one-third of humanity goes to 
bed hungry; 
why we have not formulated an economic development 
program geared to the world-wide passion 
for economic growth; 
why we have failed to win the confidence and 
respect of the billions of impatient people 
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; 
why millions of Americans lead blighted lives 
in our spreading urban slums; 
why we have fewer doctors per capita than we did 
fifty years ago and pay more for our medical 
care than ever before; 
why we spent more money last year on tranquilizers 
than on space exploration, and more on leisure 
than on learning; 
why the richest nation in the history of the world can-
not support the public services and facilities we 
must have not only for world power but for national 
growth and opportunity?l3 
To anyone who doubts Stevenson's impact on the Democratic 
Party, this catalogue of demands was to be the artillery for 
John Kennedy's successful assault of the White House. 
However, Stevenson might as well have been speaking in a 
vacuum, as Kennedy seemed assured of the nomination after his 
primary victories. But Premier Khruschev cast a dark shadow 
on Kennedy's chances and greatly strengthened Stevenson's 
cause. 
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Khruschev had made a spectacular visit to America in 
1959--the first Soviet ruler ever to do so--and had a con-
genial meeting with Eisenhower at the President's retreat 
at Camp David. Khruschev invited Eisenhower to visit Russia, 
and the two men agreed to meet with British Prime Minister 
Macmillan and French President de Gaulle to discuss Berlin, 
arms control, and other troublesome issues' 4t was decided 
AT ll r1t1,.s 
that-the summit conference would be held in ·Par-is in May, 1960. 
On May 5, 1960--less than a fortnight before the meeting--
Khruschev announced in Moscow that an American plane, a U-2, 
had been brought down in Russia. The U. s. State Department 
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration said 
that it must have been a weather research plane which acci-
dently strayed off course. Having caught the American govern-
ment in a lie, Khruschev announced on May 7 that the plane had 
been 1200 miles inside Russian territory and that the pilot 
of the plane was alive and had confessed to being on a spy 
mission; still, Khruschev refused to blame President Eisen-
hower, saying instead that the Pentagon was behind the action. 
The State Department conceded that the plane was on an 
espionage mission but added that the flight had not been 
authorized by "higher authorities'' (i.e., the President). 
Eisenhower, apparently apparently insulted by the assertions 
that he was unaware of what was going on in the U. S. govern-
ment, issued a statement accepting full responsibility for 
the flight; not only that, but he indicated that such flights 
10 
would continue. Then the President ordered a world-wide 
alert of U. S. combat forces. 
When the "Big Four" gathered in Paris, the atmosphere 
was tense. At the first meeting on May 16, Khruschev de-
manded that Eisenhower publicly apologize for the U-2 flight 
and promise that there would be no such occurrences in the 
future. Eisenhower refused; Khruschev publicly withdrew the 
invitation to visit Russia and announced that no fruitful 
conference could take place until a new President of the United 
States had been elected. Calling a press conference later, 
Khruschev--in the most violent display of public temper since 
Hitler's tirades a generation before--accused the u. S. of 
bad faith and insulted Eisenhower with virtually every 
epithet he could summon up. In addition, he threatened to 
destroy the U. s. missile bases and drive the West out of 
Berlin. 
/u T1ry1r.JC-
On May 16, Stevenson was I\ in Washington -~o test-i-f-y before 
a Senate committee on the need for televised debates during 
the Presidential campaign. Even while he was testifying, 
word had reached the U. S. of the acrimonious end of the sum-
mit conference; when he left the hearing room, Stevenson was 
mobbed by newsmen asking his political plans. He then met 
with Lyndon Johnson and other Democratic Congressional leaders 
who told him that, due to the international situation, he 
might once again be the Democratic candidate for President. 14 
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Afterwards, Stevenson conferred with Senator Monroney. 
Monroney asked that Stevenson continue to speak out on the 
vital issues and that he do nothing to hinder the ''Draft 
15 Stevenson" movement. Stevenson agreed. The U-2 crisis 
had indeed enhanced Stevenson's chances and diminished 
iT 
Kennedy's, for ~He-c~isis had prompted people to wonder 
whether Kennedy was too inexperienced for the great responsi-
bilities of the Presidency. 
The events in Paris and the humiliation Eisenhower had 
been forced to undergo had also created a clamor for national 
unity. Stevenson was infuriated, for he felt that whenever 
the Eisenhower Administration co1mnitted a blunder, the 
Republicans immediately attempted to stifle criticism by 
appealing for "national unity." 
Consequently, speaking at the Cook County Democratic 
dinner in Chicago on May 19, Stevenson discussed the U-2 
crisis and the Paris summit meeting. He deplored the boorish 
behavior of Khruschev and blamed him for wrecking the meeting, 
but he went on to say that there were certain "hard, inescap-
able facts" which could not be ignored: Khruschev had wrecked 
the summit but the American government's clumsy mistakes had 
given him the "crowbar and sledgehammer" with which to do it. 
"We cannot sweep this whole sorry mess under the rug in 
the name of national unity;• he stated, and he charged further 
.that this administration had played 
into Khruschev's hands; that if Khruschev 
wanted to wreck the conference, our government made 
it possible; that the administration acutely 
embarrassed our allies and endangered our bases; 
that they have helped make successful 
negotiations with the Russians--negotiations 
that are vital to our survival--impossible so 
long as they are in power.16 
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This speech aroused a storm of controversy: Stevenson 
I 17 was accused of appeasement and for treason. But he had 
forced a discussion of the issue. 
In fact, he was praised by many for having the moral 
courage to speak his thoughts. Some newspapers such as the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Denver Post, Milwaukee Journal, and 
l.T y k P t 11 . f h • • t • 18 ~ew or os ca ed or is nomina ion. So did Walter 
Lippmann, the dean of American political commentators, whose 
influence among liberals was enormous; Lippmann stated that a 
Stevenson-Kennedy ticket would be the most viable alternative 
to the Republicans. He said that 
Stevenson has been the successful governor 
of a big state, has had considerable experience 
in diplomacy, has had a deep indoctrination 
in American affairs in two grueling campaigns 
against an unbeatable opponent, and, all 
in all, is greatly respected in all the corners 
of the globe.19 
THt 
In keeping witlv\"statesman" image his followers were 
promoting, Stevenson, in a speech on June 1, announced a 
"grand strategy for peace": 
a) abandon the Dulles concept of "massive 
retaliation" for a more flexible military response; 
b) strengthen the political and economic unity 
of NATO by establishing an Atlantic Council; 
c) Pool the financial and technical resources 
of the Atlantic community to aid the under-
developed world; 
d) work for ''general and complete" disarmament, 
beginning with a suspension of nuclear 
testing; 
e) show the world what a vigorous democracy 
can do, by having the Federal government 
tackle the urgent problems of education, 
housing, health, urban renewal, civil 
rights, etc.20 
Stevenson was presenting this as a Democratic program, 
but it struck some--including the Kennedys--as being a 
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Stevenson program. This impression was confirmed when, a few 
days later, James Doyle formally announced the formation of 
a ''Draft Stevenson" organization. By the end of the month, 
''Draft Stevenson" groups existed in forty-two states, and 
money was flowing in to pay for newspaper advertisements and 
. l' 21 campaign iterature. 
However, it is now necessary to examine Stevenson's 
relationship with John F. Kennedy. 
III 
Stevenson and Kennedy had not known each other intimately 
before 1960, but their relations had always been friendly. 
Indeed, Kennedy, as a young freshman Senator, had placed 
Stevenson's name in nomination at the 1956 convention. How-
ever, in 1960, the two men were rivals, and their cordial re-
lations could not help but suffer. 
Kennedy, since 1956, had set his sights on 1960 as the 
time for his drive for power. Accordingly, he had built an 
impressive political organization which worked for the single 
purpose of electing John Kennedy President in 1960. Under the 
able direction of his younger brother Robert, this organiza-
tion was, in terms of financial backing, unstinting work, 
personal loyalty, and sheer political know-how, unparalleled 
in American political history. 
Kennedy's adroit touch as a politician was in contrast to 
Stevenson's inept political efforts. Stevenson, contrary to 
popular thought, was not politically naive; he just had a 
personal distaste for politics. His real love was public 
affairs and policy issues. But, as journalist Theodore H. 
White has pointed out, in America, public affairs and politics 
are inescapably bound together. White compared Stevenson's 
unrealistic attitude--love of issues and indifference to 
politics--to that of a man who deeply loves a woman but 
hates sex. 22 
As stated above, Stevenson hoped the convention would 
come to him, as it had in 1952. He failed to realize that 
15 
the political situation in 1960 was radically different from 
1952. Then, Stevenson had unquestionably been the "indis-
pensable man": there was a genuine deadlock, and he was re-
garded as the best qualified man to be President and the only 
Democrat who could run a strong race against Gene]'}\}. Eisenhower. 
Now, in 1960, Kennedy was far ahead of the other candidates in 
delegate votes1 Stevenson was a two-time loser, and, while 
Stevenson may well have been the best qualified man to be 
President, it was by no means certain that he could run a 
stronger race against the G.O.P. than Kennedy. 
Still, despite his lead, Kennedy had long worried about 
. - . d .. 23 Stevenson's "sleeping candi acy. Kennedy was trying to win 
the nomination as the liberal candidate, but he knew that 
Stevenson had a strong following in the liberal wing of the 
Party. So Kennedy's hope was to induce Stevenson to ...forma-~ly 
r-o G."' fl.'-'-Y 
withdraw~from contention and thus leave the liberal wing open 
HI IV\ 
to Kennedy. 
Kennedy knew that Stevenson's train of thought had turned 
increasingly over the years to foreign relations and that, if 
he could not be President, Stevenson desperately wanted to be 
Secretary of State. Kennedy played on this desire without 
letup to win Stevenson over to him. 
In April, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was sent to tell 
Stevenson that Kennedy would feel ''certain obligations" to 
i.J £.'jClfl'iNC& FoR. i-/1~ 
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h' ~h 24 im .L.1.. . e-were w support -*enned-y-. Several law partners of 
Stevenson who were Kennedy supporters were constantly urging 
Stevenson to be 'realistic'! support Kennedy and become 
Secretary Of State. 25 D . th . uring e Oregon primary campaign, 
Kennedy was quoted as saying that he "assumed"that any Demo-
cratic Administration would have Stevenson as Secretary of 
26 State. Stevenson still would not come into the Kennedy 
camp. 
Thus, Kennedy stopped by Stevenson's home in Libertyville, 
Illinois, on his way back from Oregon. He planned to offer 
Stevenson a quid pro quo deal: if Stevenson would formally 
withdraw from the race, announce his support for Kennedy, and, 
hopefully, place Kennedy's name in nomination at the convention, 
then he--Kennedy--would promise Stevenson the post of Secretary 
of State in the Kennedy cabinet. Newton Minow, a law partner 
of Stevenson and later Chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission, told Kennedy that such a proposal would be regarded 
by Stevenson as a bribe and would only harden him in his 
opposition. 27 As it was, Kennedy asked for his support and 
28 
was refused. 
£). Pi...fl,t-Jc..o 111s {}t::c1s;o,.; ·ro 
Stevenson to-1-tr~Schlesinger why he had-~efused Kennedy: 
"It would look as if I were jumping on the bandwagon. Every-
body would say, 'There's the deal we told you about.' It would 
. f ' b 1129 Th 1 t look as if I were angling or a JO • ere were a so wo 
L __ _ 
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other factors which strongly motivated Stevenson: his hope 
of getting nomination himself and his low opinion of Kennedy. 
During the course of 1960, Stevenson had come to regard 
Kennedy as a brash upstart. He realized that Kennedy had 
great potential, but he thought that Kennedy lacked mature 
judgment and, especially, humility; in addition, he deplored 
what he considered to be Kennedy's ruthless pursuit of power. 
Stevenson referred to Kennedy on one occasion as an "arrogant 
young man. 1130 
Similarly, Kennedy had lowered his opinion of Stevenson. 
Although he respected Stevenson's ideas and intellectual 
capacity, Kennedy felt that he was soft and namby-pamby, 
lacking the toughness and powers of decision necessary for an 
effective leader. Furthermore, he was angered by Stevenson's 
lofty, above-the-battle pose; he thought that Stevenson, 
through hypocrisy, was trying to deny him the goal for which 
he had labored so strenuously. 
The Kennedy camp was increasingly apprehensive about 
Stevenson as the July convention drew closer. It was not at 
all certain that Kennedy had enough delegate votes to win the 
nomination, and an endorsement from Stevenson would surely tip 
H1M. 
the scales for -Kennedy. Hence, Kennedy was determined to 
bring Stevenson over to his side. 
Previously, Kennedy had extended the carrot to Stevenson; 
now he intended to apply the stick. Having invited several 
close friends of Stevenson to dinner at his Georgetown home 
18 
in June, Kennedy informed them that he was now undecided 
as to whom he would appoint Secretary of State, and he said 
pointedly that Stevenson had better join the KE,.._,.~y band-
wagon or he would learn to his regret th~t he had made "a 
big mistake." 31 This could not be taken as an 'idle threat, 
as the Kennedys had already achieved a formidable reputation 
for rewarding friends and ~unishing enemies. 
Stevenson, at this same time, was being advised either 
to declare himself in.the race or out of it; that this position 
.1 t~/\I 
of neutrality would not win him the nomination, and~it was 
winning only contempt and hostility from.the Kennedys. 
Stevenson refused to change his position. 32 
IV 
This is not the place for a detailed study of the 
political machinations at the Democratic convention in Los 
Angeles. Stevenson's efforts to win the nomination can be 
described simply as ineffectual. 
Kennedy came to the convention far in the lead of the 
other contenders; but he had little more than 600 votes out 
of the 761 needed to win. Since his foremost asset was his 
image as a 11 winner 11 , Kennedy knew that he must win on the 
first ballot or he would not win at all. 
Stevenson's strategists were also aware of this. fact. 
As their early strategy had been to help Humphrey beat Kennedy 
in the primaries, their strategy now was to deny Kennedy a 
first ballot victory and deadlock the convention. With each 
succeeding ballot, Kennedy's strength would decline; the con-
vention would have to turn to another man. Who would he be? 
Symington, who had no popular support? Johnson, who was 
vigorously opposed by the liberal and Northern Democrats? It 
was believed that the convention would turn to Stevenson, the 
only one with the truly national stature of a President. 
The Stevenson forces did not intend to enlist the support 
of the party professionals; they hoped to emulate the miracle 
20 
of 1940 when Wendell Willkie received the Republican 
nomination by a stampede of popular pressure. There were 
heavy pro-Stevenson demonstrations around .the Sports Arena 
where the convention was meeting, 33 the galleries were 
packed with Stevenson supporters, and the delegates were 
deluged with telegrams u~ng them to support Stevenson. 34 
The main barrier to the success of the Stevenson move-
ment remained Stevenson himself. A prominent delegate re-
marked that "if Adlai had declared as a candidate, he would 
35 be unbeatable now.'' However, except for a statement early 
in July to the effect that he would accept the nomination if 
he was drafted, 36stevenson still refused to commit himself to 
the race and passed up a number of opportunities to win. 
The crucial delegations from Pennsylvania, California, 
Minnesota, and New York were known to have strongly pro-
Stevenson elements. If Stevenson had indicated a willingness 
to run, he might have drawn enough votes to prevent a Kennedy 
victory, but, again, he refused. 
When Stevenson appeared on the convention floor on the 
day before the balloting, bedlam broke out. For twenty minutes· 
delegates and gallery spectators chanted "We want Stevenson!'' 
Stewart Udall, a Kennedy delegate from Arizona and later 
Secretary of the Interior, said that "after about eight 'minutes, 
some of us got a funny feeling in the stomach that it might be 
Willkie all over again. 1137 Stevenson was called to the podium 
to speak to the crowd, but he spoke only a few pleasantries 
21 
and left. As Monroney later wrote, Stevenson "had but to 
say 'I seek your nomination, I need your help.' He did not 
say it. 1138 
His lackluster performance did not inspire the convention 
to come to him. Kennedy won his victory on the first ballot; 
Stevenson received only 79 1/2 votes. 39 
The battle for the nomination left bitterness in the 
Kennedy camp towards Stevenson, who was always regarded as 
their greatest threat. When Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., tried to 
persuade Robert Kennedy to make peace with the Stevensonians, 
Kennedy cut him off, saying: 11 ••• Adlai has given us a rough 
time ••. right now, I don't want to hear anything about the 
Stevensonians. 
The bitterness was not one-sided either. Anger was so 
deep among the die-hard Stevensonians that many of them planned 
to sit out the election, on the grounds that there was no 
difference between Kenndy and Richard Nixon, the Republican 
candidate. Stevenson, though, had become convinced of Kennedy's 
liberalism, and, since he despised Nixon, he attempted to rectify 
the situation. In September and October, Stevenson delivered 
over seventy speeches across the country to the faithful, 
telling them that there was indeed a difference between KenJay 
and Nixon, that Kennedy stood for the principles for which they 
fought in 1952 and 1956. In this task, he was largely 
successful. 
22 
Stevenson may have lost the battle (i.e., the Presi-
dency}, but he won the war, in the sense that his ideas 
became the accepted thinking by Americans of both parties. 
One has only to look at the platforms of the respective 
parties in 1960 to ascertain Stevenson's profound influence: 
both called for the suspension of nuclear testing, both 
stressed greater technical and economic aid to the under-
developed nations, and the Democratic platform stressed 
international arms control41--all Stevenson proposals which 
had earlier been scorned as "soft on Communism." 
Stevenson's influence could also be seen in the rhetoric 
employed by John Kennedy during the campaign. During the 
Truman years, the Democratic Party had followed a campaign 
policy of 'bread and circuses', as exemplified in the slogan, 
"you never had it so good. 11 Stevenson, in the period of 
1952-60, spoke on a far different level, saying that Americans 
must be self-critical and disciplined to be the moral leaders 
of the free world. He hammered on this theme despite--or 
because of--the easy complacency of the 1950's. By 1960, 
the American people were ready to listen, if not to Stevenson, 
to Kennedy. 
It is interesting to compare the rhetoric of the two men: 
Stevenson, 1952--
The ordeal of the Twentieth Century--the bloodiest, 
most turbulent era of the Christian age--is far 
from over. Sacrifice, patience, understanding, 
and implacable purpose may be our lot for years 
to come. Let's face it. Let's talk sense to 
the American people. Let's tell them the truth, 
that there are no gains without pains, that 
we are now on the eve of great decisions, not 
easy decisions. • 42 
Kennedy, 1960--
The old era is ending. The old ways will not 
23 
do .•• the problems are not solved and the battles 
are not all won--and we stand today on the edge of 
a New Frontier ••• But the New Frontier of which 
I speak is not a set of promises--it is a set of 
challenges. It sums up, not what I intend 
to offer the American peopLe, but what I intend 
to ask of them. It appeals to their pride, 
not their pocketbooks--it holds out the promise 
of more sacrifice instead of more security.43 
Kennedy, of course, won in November, and Stevenson paid 
for his "big mistake." Having previously "assumed" that 
Stevenson was the best qualified man to be Secretary of State, 
Kennedy now suddenly discovered that Stevenson was "too con-
44 troversial" for the post. Thus, Stevenson received the 
subordinate position of Ambassador to the United Nations, while 
the obscure Dean Rusk was chosen to head the State Department. 
A Kennedy intimate remarked that if Stevenson had supported 
Kennedy before the convention, "he could have had anything. 
He could have been Secretary of State. He could have even 
been Vice-President. 1145 
The remaining years of Stevenson's life (as U. N. 
Ambassador) were filled with bitterness and frustration. How-
ever, this study ends. with 19 60. 
v 
It is clear in retrospect that Stevenson's vacillation 
throughout 1960 ruined his chances of becoming either 
President or Secretary of State. If he desired to be Presi-
dent, then he should have fought for the nomination; if he 
desired rather to be Secretary of State, then he should have 
supported Kennedy. From a purely practical point-of-view, 
Stevenson's political performance was pitiful. 
In addition, the selfish implications of his actions 
(or non-actions) cannot be ignored. Since he clearly did not 
intend to make any effort to win· the nomination and was fat(ly 
certain that Kennedy would win, 46 it is difficult to under-
stand how, in good conscience, he could have allowed so many 
people to have given so freely of their time, efforts and 
money in his behalf. 
In the long run, however, Stevenson's contributions to 
1 . . ""~~ f f l' h American history and po itics were ar rom s ig t. During 
the dark, shameful period of McCarthyism, he--almost alone 
among u. s. political leaders--held up the light of reason 
and tolerance; his articulate criticisms of .the Dulles foreign 
policy have been proven by time to be valid; and he laid the 
groundwork for Kennedy's ~ew Frontier and Johnson's Great 
Society. In his thinking on major issues, Stevenson was 
years ahead of his time. But would his ideas alone have 
made him a great President? 
25 
An outstanding President must combine the roles of 
statJman and pragmatic politican, as is seen most clearly in 
the cases of Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. Could Stevenson 
have successfully played the two roles? Could Stevenson have 
persuaded Congress and the general public to register approval 
of his prescient ideas? 
Perhaps, in the final analysis, Stevenson's greatest 
contribution would not have been in the exercise of power 
but in the role which was alloted him: critic, educator, 
"prophet." 
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